We give a survey of the study of nonstandard models in recursion theory and reverse mathematics. We discuss the key notions and techniques in effective computability in nonstandard models. and their applications to problems concerning combinatorial principles in subsystems of second order arithmetic. Particular attention is given to principles related to Ramsey's Theorem for Pairs.

The series is devoted to the publication of high-level monographs on all areas of mathematical logic and its applications. It is addressed to advanced students and research mathematicians, and may also serve as a guide for lectures and for seminars at the graduate level.

This is a book about the philosophy of Henri Bergson which shows how relevant Bergson is to much contemporary philosophy. The book takes as its point of departure Bergson's insistence on precision in philosophy. It then discusses a variety of topics including laughter, the nature of time as experienced, how intelligence and language should be construed as a pragmatic product of evolution, and the antinomies of reason represented by magic and religion. This is not just another exposition of Bergson's work. (...) It offers an account of why Bergson commanded such a massive reading public in his own day and why he deserves to be read now. Written in a terse and clear style, this book will prove appealing to teachers and students of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, religious studies and literature. (shrink)

Reid re-argues the necessity of regarding education or teacher training and philosophy as reciprocal enterprises. The argument is conventional: educating presupposes knowledge of desirable ends; such knowledge presupposes a philosophy of the valuable. Reid avoids the problematic character of value and valuations as well as the perennially interesting problem of the "teaching of values." Education contributes to philosophy not only by being its testing ground but by the fact that all ideas are applied to action through the transforming medium of (...) the personality of the teacher. Reid's analysis of the teacher-student relationship is the most interesting part of the book and borrows both terminology and ideas from Buber.—T. C. (shrink)

This is an attempt to show, with a Roycean form of dialectic, the inadequacies of common sense, realism, and pragmatism for explaining the possibility of epistemic error, and the way their respective deficiencies require Royce's own solution. The argument is marred by repeated imprecisions of statement, and obscurities of presentation and criticism.—C. T. W.

Three of the eleven essays are about Descartes, two about Moore, and the rest concern, variously, naturalism, the expression theory of art, ordinary language philosophy, and certain attitudes toward time. Bouwsma claims to have "tried to learn" the art of doing philosophy from the later Wittgenstein and it is not surprising that what he says about the work of the latter makes his own essays more understandable. Thus, his essays are investigations of phrases from someone else's work or of phrases (...) which are typical of the language of certain philosophical theories. He is particularly concerned with phrases which, in his eyes, embody some grammatical confusion as the result of some misleading linguistic analogy. In such cases he is concerned with "quickening the sense of the queer," heightening the reader's awareness of the "scarcely perceptible deviation from sense" inherent in the way a certain philosophical question is posed, and with presenting "the meaning of those expressions which are involved in the particular case, and especially those which are relevant to exhibiting not the queerness but the sources, the roots of it". All of these essays are filled with puns, examples, and little stories. Where the latter preponderate the essays read most like traditional philosophy, and are easier to appreciate than the essays in which Bouwsma is content with "teasing the passage [and the reader] with analogies of sense."—T. C. (shrink)

Five essays, each on a different contemporary philosopher. Those on Franco Lombardi, Sartre, and Leszek Kolakowski and other present-day revisionist Marxists were presented at an American Philosophical Association symposium in 1961; the studies of Xavier Zubiri and Heidegger were added specially for this volume. In each case the authors endeavor to say something fresh and substantial; yet each piece is written in a clear and non-technical style. The anthology is therefore to be recommended to those new to the various "continental" (...) ways of doing philosophy, as well as to initiates.—C. T. W. (shrink)

This is an intelligently conceived expository treatment of topics in analytical philosophy which students often have difficulty getting clear about. There are, for example, discussions of fundamental logical notions; the many distinctions pertaining to assertions, sentences, and propositions; extension and intension; the analytic-synthetic dichotomy; the place of definition and explication in philosophical analysis, and so on. This clearly written book will not complete with extant texts but will, as the authors remark, complement them: it fills a current need.—C. T. W.

In spite of its title, this volume sheds no new light on the debated problem of whether Peirce's ideas form, or can be reconstructed to form, an integrated and internally consistent system. The book, instead, avoids the problem entirely, the pith of its thesis about the unity of Peirce's philosophy being that, in various guises, the notion of Thirdness permeates his thought. Apparently, Haas thinks it evident that to point up the central role of this notion in each of Peirce's (...) subdivisions of philosophy—Phenomenology, Logic, and Metaphysics—is to show the unity of the philosophy as a whole. But he does not counter any specific charges brought against this claim of unity—though he mentions some of them—or even outline how the conception of law is to vindicate this claim. What he does do, following Peirce's three-fold division of philosophy, is to conduct a survey built around the Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness theme; and this exposition, though uncritical, is not lacking in care and subtlety, so that those looking for an overview of Peirce's thought can profit from the book.—C. T. W. (shrink)

This collection contains 34 essays, 23 of them previously published, written between 1939 and 1960. They are of varying lengths, generality, and polish; and they cover the wide range of Hall's philosophical interests from metaphilosophy and value theory—the subjects of his best known books—to the theory of perception and the inadequacies of the Oxford philosophy of a decade ago. For Hall the study of language was not a way of repudiating or avoiding the traditional translingual issues, but rather a method (...) for attacking them. One might say that like Leibniz, Kant, and the early Wittgenstein, in their different ways, Hall took "the general form of propositions" as a philosopher's key to the basic categories of reality. Because his idiom was unfashionable among metaphysicians and because his doctrines were alien to the so-called "analysts," his work has not been widely influential. But the many insights and suggestions in this book may yet be taken up. These essays illuminate Hall's books, What Is Value?, Our Knowledge of Fact and Value, and Philosophical Systems; and they also make up an important work on their own account.—C. T. W. (shrink)